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Abstract
During most of the nineteenth century, the economy of the British crown colony
Ceylon depended almost exclusively on the export of plantation products. After
modest beginnings in the 1820s and 1830s, coffee cultivation spread on the
island in the 1840s. During the 1880s, the coffee plantations were superseded
by plantations of a new crop—tea. Both cultivation systems were almost pure
export monocultures, and both relied almost exclusively on imported wage
labour from South India. Thus, it is surprising that labour immigration—a
process vital to the efficient functioning of the plantation economy—received
practically no government attention for the better part of the nineteenth
century. Migration between South India and Ceylon was free of government
control, support or regulation. Instead, certain functional equivalents—such as
the kangany system—organised immigration and coordinated supply and demand.
Only very late in the century, when the kangany system had revealed a number
of dramatic organisational weaknesses, the Ceylon Government started to get
directly involved in labour and immigration policy.
The author can be contacted at roland.wenzlhuemer@staff.hu-berlin.de
An Agricultural Export Economy
With the conquest of the inland kingdom of Kandy in the year
1815 the British did not only politically unify the island of Ceylon
(today’s Sri Lanka) for the first time since about 600 years—they
also brought under their control the island’s region with the highest
economic potential. Their Portuguese and Dutch predecessors had
extracted economic profit from their coastal holdings (their most
notable venture being the export of cinnamon), but they had lacked
suitable lands to open large-scale cash crop plantations in higher
altitudes. Dutch attempts to introduce large-scale coffee planting to
the island failed due to the lack of suitable mid-country or up-country
lands. On the other hand, those with access to such lands—namely
the Kandyan peasantry—already produced small amounts of coffee
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on their own relying mainly on the wild-growing coffee berries. Most
of the exported coffee up to the early 1830s—around 10.000 cwt.
annually—was of such peasant origin.1
When the Ceylon Government began with the construction of a
road from the coastal capital of Colombo to Kandy, it primarily aimed
at bringing the Kandyans under closer control of the colonial power
after the so-called Kandyan rebellion of 1818. However, with the
opening of the road in 1820, they also started to economically develop
the Sri Lankan highlands. The hitherto difficult-to-reach Kandyan
highlands were infrastructurally connected to a slowly emerging
transport network and, accordingly, to the commercial centres of the
coast. The Colombo-Kandy road thus served at least two different
ends crucial to an economically favourable environment: it a) opened
up suitable plantation lands and b) provided for the security of
potential investments. With plantation land readily available, local
capital was soon attracted to the region. During the 1820s, coffee
plantations started to serve as a capital outlet mainly for local
Government officials. Governor Edward Barnes, for instance, granted
land near Gampola to Colonel George Bird in 1823–24. Barnes
himself also participated in coffee cultivation in the 1820s and
several others established plantations as well. However, according to
Michael Roberts, most of these early ventures remained economically
unsuccessful.2 Reasons for this can be found in the use of not
fully suitable land in too low altitudes, the unfavourable position of
Ceylonese coffee in the world economy—with the West Indies as a
formidable competitor—and the lack of coffee cultivating skills.
During the 1830s, the national and international economic
background concerning the cultivation of coffee changed profoundly.
In Ceylon, the Cameron-Colebrooke reforms of 1833 abolished
the cinnamon monopoly inherited from the Dutch and liberalised
the cinnamon trade.3 This placed Ceylonese cinnamon at a
disadvantageous position in the world market and practically killed
cinnamon cultivation on the island thereby creating demand for a
1 M. Roberts and L. A. Wickremeratne, ‘Export Agriculture in the Nineteenth
Century’, in K. M. De Silva (ed.),University of Ceylon History of Ceylon. From the Beginning
of the Nineteenth Century to 1948 (Peradeniya: University of Peradeniya, 1973), p. 92.
2 Ibid., p. 94.
3 For a more detailed description of the cinnamon trade in the early nineteenth
century see: V. Samaraweera, “Economic and social developments under the British,
1796–1832”, in K. M. De Silva (ed.), University of Ceylon History of Ceylon. From the
Beginning of the Nineteenth Century to 1948 (Peradeniya: University of Peradeniya, 1973).
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TABLE 1
The Ceylon Coffee Industry, 1834–69 (Annual Figures and Annual Averages)
Year
Export volume
(in 000 cwt.)
Export unit
value (in s./cwt.)
Area planted
(in 000 acres)
Yield5 (in
cwt./acre)
1834 26 30 n/a n/a
1835–39 46 47 n/a n/a
1840–44 97 49 23 4.2
1845–49 260 33 51 5.1
1850–54 344 40 59 5.9
1855–59 537 48 138 3.9
1860–64 615 51 199 3.1
1865–69 939 52 243 3.9
Source: Snodgrass (1966): 20.
different cash crop. Meanwhile at the other end of the British Empire,
the West Indian coffee producers faced a severe crisis. The British
Government not only abolished slavery and thus deprived the West
Indian plantations of their cheap and reliable labour supply, it also
fixed the custom duty for both West Indian and Ceylonese coffee at
6 d. per pound4 and discontinued its protective policy towards the
West Indian coffee trade. The consequent crisis of West Indian coffee
cultivation placed theCeylonese plantations at an excellent position in
the world market. At the same time, tropical agriculturists introduced
Caribbean coffee growing skills to the island and improved the
methods employed in the planting and processing of coffee. Combined,
these factors triggered the rush into coffee cultivation that Ceylon
witnessed in the 1830s and during the ‘coffee-mania’ of the 1840s.
Table 1 has been adapted from Donald Snodgrass’ important
but meanwhile out-of-date work6 on Ceylon’s agricultural export
economy. The figures rely on official sources and, thus, are incomplete
and only half-accurate at times. Nevertheless, they illustrate the
rapid expansion of coffee cultivation and export in Ceylon from
the 1830s onwards. Favourable world market conditions, developing
infrastructure and incredibly cheap plantation land had turned coffee
4 A. Bandarage,Colonialism inSri Lanka: The Political Economy of the KandyanHighlands,
1833–1886, vol. 39, New Babylon, Studies in the Social Sciences (Berlin, New York:
Mouton, 1983), p. 72.
5 This is not the actual average yield per acre. Snodgrass simply divided the export
volume of coffee by the total area under the crop—areas in bearing as well as newly
planted areas.
6 D. R. Snodgrass, Ceylon; an Export Economy in Transition (Homewood, Illinois.: R. D.
Irwin, 1966).
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cultivation into a highly profitable business during the 1830s. Planters
and capital from the homeland soon started to pour into the colony
and furthered the expansion of the plantation economy.7 During
the so-called ‘coffee-mania’ of the 1840s, Ceylon’s economy was re-
structured as a plantation-based agricultural export economy, and
coffee monoculture firmly established for the next forty years.
Local Labour Shortage
In his seminal work on tropical agriculture, W. A. Lewis identifies
four ‘preconditions for agricultural exports’ additional to the standard
factors of production land, labour and capital: internal peace, water,
transportation and economies of scale.8 In the case of Ceylon’s
emerging coffee export economy, most of these preconditions were
easily fulfilled: with the opening of the Kandyan highlands, suitable
plantation landwas readily and cheaply available; the favourable world
market conditions attracted large amounts of capital to the island and
facilitated the rise of banks and agency-houses in Ceylon; internal
peace and transportation were secured by the Ceylon Government’s
investments in road construction and communications development;
rich in rainfall the Kandyan highlands initially offered enough water
for both peasant and plantation agriculture;9 and economies of scale
only became relevant in Ceylon with the transition from coffee to tea
cultivation during the 1880s.
Only the supply of the emerging plantation sector with a steady and
reliable labour force could apparently not be guaranteed with only
local resources at hand. In the early nineteenth century the forest-
covered central highlands ofCeylonwere relatively sparsely populated.
Pressure on land was practically unknown until the tremendous
expansion of coffee plantations in the 1850s and 1860s. The Kandyan
peasantry in the highlands made a living from paddy cultivation,
7 I. H. Vanden Driesen, “Some aspects of the financing of commercial enterprise
in 19th century Ceylon”, Ceylon University Review, vol. 18, no. 3+4 (1960), 215. I. H.
Vanden Driesen, “Some trends in the economic history of ceylon in the ‘Modern’
Period”, Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies, vol. 3, no. 1 (1960), 13.
8 W. A. Lewis, “The export stimulus”, inW. Arthur Lewis (ed.),Tropical Development,
1880–1913 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 16.
9 Later in the nineteenth century, clean water became a rarer commodity in the
highlands, as the ever-expanding plantations in higher altitudes started to cut into
the water supply of the village paddy fields. See: J. L. A. Webb, Tropical Pioneers: Human
Agency and Ecological Change in the Highlands of Sri Lanka, 1800–1900,Ohio University Press
Series in Ecology and History (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2002), pp. 87–88.
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shifting cultivation and from small coffee gardens of their own.
Landlessness was not widespread and those who did not own land
themselves usually worked as sharecroppers. As Wickramasinghe and
Cameron put it, ‘[n]ot land but labour was scarce.’10 Taxation in those
early decades of the nineteenth century remained rather light and
payable either in cash or kind.11 The so-called cash nexus had not yet
reached the peasant communities of the highlands and accordingly
the peasantry’s demand for ready cash was limited and could mostly
be satisfied from their small-scale trade in coffee.
Taken together these were not very promising circumstances as
regards the creation of a permanent wage labour force for the
plantations. In the days of coffee cultivation, the Kandyan peasants
simply did not experience enough economic pressure to be pushed into
plantationwage labour in any significant numbers. Although Sinhalese
peasants frequently entered into contracts with the planters and
mainly cleared forest land for future plantations, these assignments
weremostly of a temporary nature and for a fixed task only. Regarding
the Sinhalese contribution to regular estate wage labour during the
early years of coffee cultivation, little has been researched and written
on this topic—and when we find clear statements on that topic,
scholarly opinions diverge. While it seems to be a widespread view
among economic historians of nineteenth-century Ceylon that the
first coffee planters of the 1820s and 1830s employed Sinhalese
wage labour as well, relied largely on Sinhalese labour or at least
desperately tried to recruit local Sinhalese labour, this view has
recently been challenged by Patrick Peebles in ‘The Plantation Tamils
of Ceylon’. Peebles says that ‘there is little evidence that planters attempted
and failed to hire a Sinhalese plantation labor force. There are few references
by planters in the 1840s to Sinhalese laborers except to praise their skill at
felling jungle’.12 Although Peebles has been overly keen throughout
the entire book to re-write the history of the plantation Tamils and
is often not able to present convincing evidence for his views, he
might have a point when he doubts the coffee planters’ dedication
to obtaining a labour force locally. In Peebles’ opinion the myth of
10 D.W. A.Wickramasinghe andD. C. Cameron, “British Capital, Ceylonese Land,
Indian Labour: The Imperialism and Colonialism of Evolution of Tea Plantations
in Sri Lanka”. (Paper presented at the Critical Management Studies Conference
(Management and Organizational History), Cambridge, 4–6 July 2005).
11 D. Wesumperuma, Indian Immigrant Plantation Workers in Sri Lanka: A Historical
Perspective, 1880–1910. (Nugegoda: Dharmapriya Wesumperuma, 1986), p. 11.
12 P. Peebles, The Plantation Tamils of Ceylon, New Historical Perspectives on Migration
(London, New York: Leicester University Press, 2001), p. 30.
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the Sinhalese peasants’ reluctance to take up wage labour has mainly
been a British construction of later days to justify the ‘import’ of
Indian labourers.13 With only rare references to the composition of the
early coffee labour force, it remains difficult to establish the Sinhalese
contribution to estate wage labour in the 1820s and 1830s. As cited by
Peebles,14 Boyd refers to Sinhalese labourers working under Sinhalese
foremen on plantations in the year 1838. Later, the planter Frederick
Lewis describes the workforce employed on his estate as largely of
Sinhalese origin.15 And, as I have pointed out elsewhere, the late
1880s and 1890s see a rush of impoverished Sinhalese villagers into
plantation wage labour.16 This generally supports the notion that a
certain number of Sinhalese villagers have always sold their work
to the estates—presumably mostly those who lived in the vicinity
of the plantations and were able to return to their villages every
evening.17 We will probably never be able to give anything like an
accurate number of Sinhalese working on the estates in the 1820s and
1830s. However, it is reasonable to suggest that only a comparatively
small number of Sinhalese villagers have done so, when we consider
the missing economic pressure and the frequent ill-treatment of the
workers by estate superintendents.18
Considering all the evidence we have at this point, it seems only
reasonable to assume that the planters indeed have not tried to
recruit local Sinhalese labour particularly desperately. On the one
hand, a certain portion of Sinhalese villagers was not at all adverse to
estate wage labour, as we have seen above. And the labour demand of
the earliest plantations has been manageable. On the other hand,
there have already been around10,000 immigrant labourers inCeylon
in the 1820s and 1830s19 looking for work in road construction, the
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 F. Lewis, Sixty-Four Years in Ceylon: Reminiscences of Life and Adventure (Colombo:
Colombo Apothecaries, 1926), pp. 191–92.
16 R. Wenzlhuemer, “The Sinhalese contribution to estate labour in Ceylon, 1881–
1891”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 48, no. 3 (2005).
17 See F. Heidemann, Kanganies in Sri Lanka and Malaysia: Tamil Recruiter-Cum-
Foreman as a Sociological Category in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century, Ganesha; 5
(Muenchen: Anacon, 1992), p. 11.
18 M. Roberts, “Indian estate labour in Ceylon during the coffee period (1830–
1880). Part 1”, Indian Economic and Social History Review, vol. 3, no. 1 (1966), 1.
19 Heidemann, Kanganies in Sri Lanka and Malaysia, 11. N. Kuruppu, “A history of
the working-class movement in Ceylon. 1. Labour and the rise of capitalism”, Ceylon
Historical Journal, vol. 1, no. 2 (1951), 134.
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upkeep of irrigation facilities or as agricultural labourers. With such
a plentiful, willing and cheap labour supply at hand, it seems doubtful
that the coffee planters have spent more time and effort on the
recruitment of Sinhalese villagers than was absolutely necessary. At
the same time, it becomes unlikely that the abolition of rajakariya
labour (corvee labour) by the Cameron-Colebrooke reforms of 1833
really aimed at the creation of a wage labour market, as it has often
been pointed out.20
Indian Labour Migration
So, although local Sinhalese villagers participated in plantation wage
labour in those early coffee years, the planters soon tapped a different
source of cheap labour. Agricultural wage labourers from the densely
populated regions of South India were close at hand looking for
employment on the neighbouring island of Ceylon. The Ceylon
Government had used an immigrant workforce from South India for
public works construction since the turn of the century. Favoured by
its geographical proximity, the island of Ceylon had early become
one of the first outlets for South Indian excess labour. In the 1830s,
other British colonies around the globe began to see the potential
benefits of South India’s well-stocked labour market and started to
recruit labour there. In the year 1834, labour migration from India to
most parts of the world was organised along the lines of the infamous
indenture system. Onlymigration to the comparatively close and easy-
to-reach destinations Ceylon,Malaya and Burma (then officially a part
of British India) remained so-called ‘free’21 labour migration.
20 For instance, by Wesumperuma, Indian Immigrant Plantation Workers, 6. Rather,
the main intention behind the abolition was a weakening of the powers of the
mudaliyars who controlled the rajakariya labour force and abused this power to their
own advantage. See P. Peebles, Social Change in Nineteenth Century Ceylon (New Delhi:
Navrang in collaboration with Lake House Bookshop, Colombo, 1995), pp. 118–19.
Until its abolition rajakariya labour had also been used on the Government officials’
own estates. See N. Dawood, Tea and Poverty: Plantations and the Political Economy of Sri
Lanka (Kowloon, Hong Kong: Urban Rural Mission, Christian Conference of Asia,
1980), p. 43.
21 It has become a well-established tradition among historians concerned with this
kind of ‘free’ labour migration to put the word ‘free’ within inverted commas. As we
will see later, the rigorous contracts binding the labourers in the indenture system
had several functional equivalents in ‘free’ labour migration attaching the labourers
in more informal but only little less effective ways to their employers.
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In the overpopulated regions of the Madras Presidency landlessness
was widespread and droughts and famines occurred frequently.22
Satyanarayana shows that labour emigration from South India
responded regionally as well as chronologically to crop failures, bad
seasons, famines or other environmental calamities.23 The number
of landless agricultural labourers in the South Indian districts—
already about 10 to 15% of the total population at the beginning of
the nineteenth century—further increased throughout the century.24
This was partly due to the ‘disintegration of the Indian village handicraft
industries consequent on the flooding of the Indian market with cheaper British-
manufactured articles’.25 Many village artisans could not compete with
the British producers and had to make a living as agricultural
labourers. Furthermore, the ongoing monetisation of village life and
the introduction of the cash nexus to the traditional Indian villages
drove many small peasant proprietors into indebtedness and, as a
consequence, into landlessness, as debtors were often dispossessed
of their holdings.26 This further increased the number of landless
agricultural labourers in search for employment and created a demand
for ready cash at a very early date.
Thus, agricultural labourers responded to arising ‘job opportunities’
outside South India in steadily increasing numbers. By the 1830s,
labour emigration from India had increased to such an extent that
the Government of India enacted the Indian Emigration Ordinance
regulating the terms of Indian labour migration. Employer and
employee entered into a three- or five-year contract that fixed mutual
rights and duties. Labour recruiters in India had to obtain a license
from the government and recruitment as well as the conditions of
the labourers in the country of destination became—theoretically—
observed by the Indian and the ‘host’ government. Recruitment,
transhipment and plantation work were rigidly organised and partially
subsidised by the government both to secure a steady supply of
labour to the overseas plantations and to guarantee the welfare of
the labourers. The thus enacted system of labour recruitment and
22 O. Hollup, Bonded Labour: Caste and Cultural Identity among Tamil Plantation Workers
in Sri Lanka (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1994), p. 26.
23 Adapa Satyanarayana, Birds of Passage. Migration of South Indian Labour Communities
to South-East Asia, 19–20th Centuries, A.D., Clara Working Paper 11 (Amsterdam: 2001),
13.
24 D. Wesumperuma, Indian Immigrant Plantation Workers, p. 15.
25 Ibid., p. 16.
26 Ibid.
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migration became known as the indenture system. Lax government
controls and the pronounced economic interest of the ‘hosts’ led to
frequent abuses of the system and the availability of a cheap and
steady workforce soon becamemuch more important than the welfare
of the workers. In the year 1834, the first indentured labourers
were recruited in India and transhipped to the sugar plantations of
Mauritius. However, the living andworking conditions of the labourers
were so harsh that the Indian Government suspended emigration
to Mauritius in 1839. Only in 1842 the Colonial Office yielded to
the planters’ pressure and ordered the resumption of indentured
migration toMauritius.27 It is little surprising that, accordingly, labour
migration under the indenture system soon became known as ‘unfree’
labour migration and labour historians have frequently referred to it
as a ‘new system of slavery’.28
Labour migration from India to Sri Lanka (as well as Burma and
Malaya) was not organised along the lines of the indenture system.
Migration in these cases was free of government intervention and
the Indian Emigration Ordinance did not cover migration across
the Paumben Strait. This policy of the Indian Government might
be attributed to a variety of different lines of thought: firstly, Ceylon’s
location so close to South India made an effective control of migration
between the two colonies practically impossible; secondly, labour
migration to Ceylon was—at least allegedly—primarily of a merely
seasonal (and thus cyclic) character; thirdly, considering the long-
established trade and social links across the Paumben Strait economic
push and pull factors seemed sufficient to regulate the flow of
migrant labour; fourthly, it was appreciated by the Madras officials
to have an outlet for excess agricultural labourers; fifthly, the Ceylon
Government had already hired South Indian labour since the turn
of the century; and sixthly, the island seemed close enough to keep
an eye on the living and working conditions of the labourers anyway.
Especially, items one and four seemed to have played a decisive role
in the decision-making process.
Thus, migration between South India and Ceylon remained free
throughout the nineteenth century. Migrant workers were not
subjected to government control and were not bound by indenture-like
27 P. Peebles, The Plantation Tamils of Ceylon, p. 26.
28 See H. R. Tinker, A New System of Slavery. The Export of Indian Labour Overseas,
1830–1920 (London: Oxford University Press, for the Institute of Race Relations,
1974).
584 ROLAND WENZLHUEMER
contracts for years. Although the legal possibility to enter into written
contracts existed, practically all immigrant labourers had merely
verbal contracts with their employers. These contracts had a validity
of one month and were automatically extended at the end of each day.
Both parties could terminate the engagement at one month’s notice.
From a legal perspective, this practice rendered the immigrants free
wage labourers as they were not bound by year-longwork contracts and
were free to quit at relatively short notice. With the acreage under
coffee rapidly expanding, it soon became obvious that such lenient
terms of contract would not especially contribute to the creation of
a reliable and steady labour force in Ceylon—even with a seemingly
infinite supply of potential wage labourers close at hand in South
India. Thus, the labourers were bound to their employers by other
means which will be discussed in detail later: restrictive labour laws,
debt bondage and marginal balance wages.
Migration to Sri Lanka
Due to their geographical proximity migration and trade between
South India and Ceylon both build on a longstanding history. The
history of the island’s kingdoms as well as Ceylon’s ethnic composition
both tell tales of the close relations maintained across the easily
traversable Paumben Strait. Although we do not possess any reliable
quantitative evidence for this, it is reasonable to suggest that
the comparatively sparsely populated island has attracted landless
agricultural labourers from South India even before the advent of
the British. Therefore, we cannot say whether the early immigrant
labourers were actively recruited by Ceylonese planters or the Ceylon
Government in their Indian homeland or whether they were simply
hired while looking for work in Ceylon on their own initiative.29 What
29 Again, Patrick Peebles challenges a longstanding view (advocated, for instance,
by Kingsley De Silva) that even the earliest immigrants were recruited in India.
Peebles turns De Silva’s argument around and holds that active labour recruitment
came into existence only in later coffee planting years. Unfortunately, Peebles does
not present any reliable evidence for his notion and, accordingly, his view remains
just as plausible as De Silva’s. Peebles, The Plantation Tamils of Ceylon, p. 27. Kingsley
M. De Silva, “Indian immigration to Ceylon: the first phase C. 1840–1855”, Ceylon
Journal of Historical and Social Studies, vol. 4 (1961), 110. Kingsley M. De Silva, Social
Policy and Missionary Organizations in Ceylon, 1840–1855 (London: Longmans, 1965),
p. 239.
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we know is that Governor Frederick North in the very first years of
the nineteenth century employed a pioneer corps consisting of Indian
immigrants. And during the Kandyan rebellion of 1818 Governor
Brownrigg relied on 5,000 Indian workers to make up for the local
labour shortage in the wake of the rebellion. Brownrigg’s successor
Barnes employed Indian labour (together with rajakariya labour) in the
construction and upkeep of public works—mostly roads.30 Although
this does not shed more light on the place of recruitment, it illustrates
that the early coffee planters could easily benefit from the existing
practice of labour migration from South India when confronted with
a local shortage of wage labour. This is even more noteworthy as
the earliest coffee estates of the 1820s served primarily as a field of
financial investment for high-ranking Government officials for whom
Indian immigrant labour was easily obtainable.
By 1844 the latest, labour recruitment in India became common
as the Planters’ Association reports that the owner of Black Forest
estate sent a recruiter to India in that year who later returned
with fourteen workers.31 Whether or not this really marks the first
occurrence of direct Ceylonese labour recruitment in India, the ever-
rising labour needs during the ‘coffee-mania’ of the 1840s demanded
for a steady influx of agricultural labourers and, thus, for a more
thoroughly organised system of labour recruitment. To this demand
responded the so-called kanganies. Hitherto these kanganies had simply
been persons of some reputation and experience who acted as leaders-
among-equals for the immigrating labour gangs. Usually they had
already worked on Ceylonese plantations or in construction gangs
and now put their experience to use by leading willing labourers
to the plantation districts of Ceylon and establishing contact with
the planters. During that early phase the kangany was a labourer
himself and exerted no or little power over the other labourers who
originated largely from the kangany’s village or kinship group.32 On
the estates, the kanganies served as middlemen between the planters
and the workers.
30 N. Kuruppu, “A history of the working-class movement”, p. 134. C. R. De Silva,
Ceylon under the British Occupation, 1795–1833 (Colombo: Colombo Apothecaries,
1953), p. 405.
31 P. Peebles, The Plantation Tamils of Ceylon, p. 27. L. De Mel, The Evolution of
Industrial Relations in Ceylon; with Special Reference to Plantations, International Educational
Materials Exchange, 3026 (Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 1972),
p. 1.
32 F. Heidemann, Kanganies in Sri Lanka and Malaysia, pp. 12–13.
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This early kangany system—based largely on kinship ties and
reputation—soon failed to secure a labour force large enough to
satisfy the demand. Therefore, the planters encouraged the kanganies
to actively recruit labourers in India. They chose reliable kanganies
or experienced workers and sent them to South India to recruit
new labourers. With the rapid expansion of the plantation system
the demand for immigrant labour rose so quickly that the planters
started to give so-called coast advances to the kanganies—advances
to finance the recruiter’s journey to India as well as the return trip
of the future labourers. Additionally, the kanganies started to receive
a premium for every recruited labourer that they brought to the
estates. Therefore, the late 1840s and 1850s saw the emergence of the
professional kanganies, who did not make a living as estate labourers
anymore but earned their money as professional labour recruiters and
supervisors.33 We will soon see how this newly established recruitment
and immigration system started to secure the planters’ (and later the
kanganies’) hold over the immigrant labourers and acted as an effective
functional equivalent to the non-existent government efforts towards
the organisation of labour immigration.
Early Government Policy, Labour Legislation and
Functional Equivalents
Patrick Peebles holds that up to the year 1839 theCeylonGovernment
has viewed Indian labour immigration with a critical eye and even
opposed it.34 Again, the evidence presented to support this notion is
scarce and altogether not very convincing—especially given the fact
that up to the 1830s the Ceylon Government (along with government
officials) has been the chief employer of Indian labour in Ceylon. But
what can be safely said is that the Ceylon Government did neither
recognise the present and future importance of Indian labour for the
Ceylonese economy nor did it actively encourage the influx of Indian
labour.Only in1839did the government begin to compose statistics on
immigration. Furthermore, the Ceylon Government built a causeway
to Mannar and established a ferry service between Rameswaram and
Mannar, thus facilitating the crossing of the Paumben Strait for
33 Ibid., p. 16.
34 P. Peebles, The Plantation Tamils of Ceylon, p. 84.
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the labourers.35 However, these government efforts remained half-
hearted. Many immigrants came to Ceylon on small, privately owned
sailing vessels and, thus, neither made use of the newly established
infrastructure nor entered into the official statistics.
At no point of the immigration process did the Ceylon Government
intervene or offer support. Until very late in the nineteenth century,
labour immigration from India to Ceylon remained absolutely free—
meaning in that respect free from government control and influence
from the very recruiting to the arrival at the Ceylonese estates.
However, the relationship between employer and employees once
on the estates, their mutual obligations and rights had to be laid
down and regulated somehow. Until the enactment of Ordinance 5
of 184136 the status, duties and (most of all) the rights of immigrant
labourers in Ceylon were legally not clearly defined. This ordinance
(and its various amendments) became known as the Master and
Servant Laws37 and, indeed, in its first draft aimed solely at the
regulation of the relationship between an employer and a domestic
servant.38 But facing a legal vacuum as regards the status of plantation
labourers, the version of the ordinance enacted in 1841 was extended
to apply to estate labourers as well. The provisions of Ordinance 5 of
1841 were later consolidated and slightly refined with the enactment
of Ordinance 11 of 1865.39 In short, the Master and Servant Laws
regulated the duties of a servant/plantation labourer and identified
three actions of such labourers leading to criminal prosecution: neglect
of duty (e. g. late attendance, refusal to work etc.) a wide array of
‘misconduct’ in service (e. g. drunkenness, disobedience, etc.) and
the quitting of service without one month’s prior notice.40 A labourer
found guilty of one of these charges was liable to a fine of up to £5 or
up to three months imprisonment. The only offence on the part of the
employer recognised by the Master and Servant Laws was the refusal
to pay wages. Furthermore, it is important to note that breaches of
35 Ibid., p. 85.
36 CO 56/2, Ceylon Acts 1841–1843.
37 For a further discussion of the Master and Servant Law and its amendments
see M. Roberts, “The Master–Servant Laws of 1841 and the 1860s and Immigrant
Labour in Ceylon”, Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies, vol. 8, no. 1+2 (1965).
38 R. Weerakoon, The Evolution of Labour Law in Sri Lanka: Tea Plantation to Free Trade
Zone (Colombo: Ceylon Federation of Labour, 1986), pp. 112–13.
39 CO 56/9, Ceylon Acts 1864–1869.
40 L. De Mel, The Evolution of Industrial Relations in Ceylon; with Special Reference to
Plantations, p. 3.
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contract under the Master and Servant Laws were deemed criminal
offences and thus were speedily dealt with by criminal courts, whereas
under Common Law such breaches of contract would have been the
subject of civil actions only.41
Ordinance 13 of 188942 further amended the Master and Servant
Laws and clarified two imprecise passages: For the first time a
distinction between domestic servants and plantation labourers was
made and, secondly, the definition of ‘employer’ was extended to
the current superintendent of an estate, thus solving practical
problems frequently arising in the implementation of the laws due
to absentee planters. Additionally, the amendment legally recognised
the longstanding practice regarding verbal contracts. ‘In practice, verbal
contract meant the entry of the labourer’s name in the estate check-roll and the
acceptance by the labourer of the quota of rice issued by the estate as part payment
of wages’.43 This practice now had a legal footing.
From a merely legal viewpoint, the Master and Servant Laws
provided both the planter and the labourer with valuable instruments
to defend their interests. On the one hand, the planter could easily
sue his labourers for breach of contract in various situations as such
breaches were broadly (and vaguely) defined. Although Ordinance 11
of 1865 obliged the employer to provide his employees with lodgings,
food and medical care during periods of sickness, refusal to pay wages
remained the only prosecutable offence on the part of the employer.
On the other hand, the Master and Servant Laws recognised the
‘free’ nature of plantation labour. Although the possibility existed
to enter into longer written contracts, almost all labour relations were
regulated on the basis of verbal one-month contracts. In theory, the
labourer could leave an estate at one month’s notice. In times of
ever-rising labour demand, this would have placed some power in the
hands of the labourers. In reality, a number of customs and practices of
plantation recruitment and life kept the bulk of the immigrant labour
force from enforcing their rights as laid down in the legislation. The
rigid hierarchy of the kangany system and an evolving network of debt
bondage served as functional equivalents and secured the availability
of a cheap and steady labour force.
We have already briefly discussed how the rising labour demands
of the 1840s and 1850s led to the emergence of the first professional
41 Ibid., pp. 2–3.
42 CO 56/12, Ceylon Acts 1885–1889.
43 D. Wesumperuma, Indian Immigrant Plantation Workers, p. 26.
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kanganies. Equipped with substantial cash advances those recruiters
were sent to the ‘coast’—i. e. to South India—to bring back as many
new labourers as possible. Originally intended to cover the cost of
the kangany’s and the labourers’ journey, the coast advances soon rose
far beyond that in the eye of the steadily growing competition for
labour. Vanden Driesen once called the system of coast advances ‘the
villain of the piece’.44 Each labourer’s share of the coast advance was
deducted fromhis wages in rates. Therefore, the immigrant plantation
workers were indebted from the very start of their estate employment.
The labourers often owed sums to the planter that they had not
even received, as the kanganies tried to keep travel and food costs
at a minimum and pocketed the excess money.45 This practice also
contributed heavily to the high death rates during the immigrants’
journey to the estates. Contemporaries estimated that the kanganies
spent not even a third of the coast advance and that therefore hundreds
of immigrants died of starvation—their bodies being thrown into the
sea or left behind at the roadside.46
It is important to see that the labourer himself was not directly
indebted to the planter. The kanganies occupied an intermediary role
in the relation between the planters and the labourers. They owed
the total sum given as a coast advance to the planter, and the Indian
labourers owed their shares to the kangany. Naturally, this gave the
latter a strong hold over the individual labourer, who had already
borrowed money to settle his debts in his home village and for the
journey before he had even started to work. The kanganies usually
charged the labourers with the full sum of the coast advance—even
if they had only spent a third or so of the money. Furthermore,
the payment of the wages and the issuing of the rice rations were
conducted via the kanganies, who by and by became labour supervisors
more than workers. Practically, the kangany emerged as the only
remaining link between the planter and his workforce.
As the kanganies received a premium for every recruited labourer and
later so-called ‘head money’ for each of their labourers who turned up
for work each day47, they were interested in recruiting as many new
workers as possible. Therefore, ‘[t]he group became more heterogeneous, often
44 I. H. Vanden Driesen, Indian Plantation Labour in Sri Lanka: Aspects of the History of
Immigration in the 19th Century (Nedlands, Australia: Centre for South and Southeast
Asian Studies, University of Western Australia, 1982), p. 117.
45 D. Wesumperuma, Indian Immigrant Plantation Workers, p. 62.
46 F. Heidemann, Kanganies in Sri Lanka and Malaysia, p. 18.
47 D. Wesumperuma, Indian Immigrant Plantation Workers, p. 62.
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the labourers hailed from various villages, and in many cases the members had
no personal contact before the departure’.48 This weakened the influence of
kinship or other social ties among the labourers and the kanganies, and
further enhanced the dependence of the recruited on the recruiter.
Briefly, the fact that the professional kanganies’ income depended on
the number of recruited labourers and on their performance on the
estate, can be identified as ‘the villain of the piece’. Recruitment methods
became harsher to maximise the number of immigrants (sometimes
even culminating in the kidnapping of villagers or even minors by
the kanganies49) and many labourers were ruthlessly exploited during
the journey and their stay at the estate. The kanganies’ hold over the
labourers’ wages and rice ration further aggravated the situation.
Heavily indebted to the kangany, without any social security and
receiving money and food only through the kangany’s hands, the term
‘free labour’ loses much of its accuracy. Although every plantation
worker was theoretically entitled to quit his employer’s service at one
month’s notice, the informal bondage between the worker and the
kangany prevented any such move. For the average labourer, it was
almost impossible to repay his debts quickly. Firstly, it had become
a common practice among the professional kanganies of the 1850s
and later to burden the labourers with a much too high initial debt.
As a good part of the labourer’s wages was issued in kind—namely
in rations of one bushel of rice per month for an adult male—only
a small margin was paid as balance wages in cash. Dharmapriya
Wesumperuma provides us with some figures concerning balance
wages and indebtedness in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
According to him, the balance wages of a male worker could amount
to anything between 21 and 46 r. per year in economically good times.
The annual costs of living for an estate worker in the years from 1886
to 1893 lay between 12 and 18.5 r.50 This left a margin of 2.5 to
36 r. annually out of which the labourer had to repay the debts (with
an average coast advance ranging from 10 to 20 r.). In these figures
no allowance has been made for any cheating or levying of interest on
the part of the kanganies. Thus, it becomes clear that the repayment of
his full debt might bind a labourer to a kangany for years to come.
While the labourers where bound by debt to their kanganies, the
latter owed the sum of the initial coast advance to the planter. During
48 F. Heidemann, Kanganies in Sri Lanka and Malaysia, p. 17.
49 Ibid., p. 22.
50 D. Wesumperuma, Indian Immigrant Plantation Workers, p. 211.
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the early years of coffee planting, this two-layer relationship gave
the planters a strong hold over the labourers. Later, the kanganies
benefited both from their increasing margin of profit and from the
introduction of the so-called tundu system. With increasing coast
advances charged on the labourers’ debts but still the same amount
really spent, the kangany’s net profit steadily rose—and he became
less bound to an individual planter. At the same time, the planting
community of Ceylon introduced the tundu system to counteract the
spreading practice of ‘crimping’. So-called ‘crimping kanganies’ tried to
hire deserted labourers (or induced labourers to desert) and sold their
labour to the highest bidding planter. As this practice soon proved to
be a nuisance to the planters, they introduced the following system:
a tundu (meaning a receipt or bill) was issued to the kangany stating
his total debt to the planter. Based on the tundu, the future employer
had to give an advance to the kangany to settle his old debt, before
entering in the new service. ‘Crimping kanganies’ and their deserted
labourers could not produce a tundu and, thus, could not enter into the
service of a new employer.51 Furthermore, the tundu system helped to
keep the regional balance between areas with a surplus of labour and
others short of it. However, in the long run, the introduction of the
tundu system only strengthened the position of the kangany. In times
of labour shortage the tundu system enabled the kanganies to extract
advances considerably higher than the tundu debt, and often the labour
gangs where transferred from estate to estate.52
Government Involvement and the Medical Wants of the
Plantation Labourers
During the heyday of coffee planting in the 1860s and 1870s and
during the tea boom of the late 1880s and 1890s many kanganies
made excessive use of their privileges under the tundu system. They
consolidated their hold over the labourers, maximised their profits
and used times of labour shortage to blackmail the planters and to
extract exaggerated advances. Organised in the Planters’ Association,
the planting community tried its best to counteract this shift of
power. The Ceylon Government itself started to get involved in the
recruitment and migration process of the Indian labourers only in
51 F. Heidemann, Kanganies in Sri Lanka and Malaysia, p. 20.
52 D. Wesumperuma, Indian Immigrant Plantation Workers, p. 109.
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the last two decades of the nineteenth century. And only in the early
twentieth century, measures were implemented to cut the powers of
the kanganies, to counteract debt bondage and to safeguard certain
vital interests of the labourers (as well as the planters).
Beyond regulating the status of the labourers and the relationship
between employer and employee in the Master and Servant Laws,
the Ceylon Government became directly involved in labour politics
in the 1880s only. On 12th December 1880 the government enacted
Ordinance 17 of 1880, ‘TheMedicalWants Ordinance’,53 and thereby
took over the direct responsibility formuch of the health care available
to immigrant plantation workers. Until the year 1872, the planter
usually treated a sick labourer himself. Only in severe cases—a
decision that the medically unskilled planter had to make—workers
were taken to a government civil hospital usually miles and miles
away. Doctors in these civil hospitals complained bitterly that in
many cases sick immigrants were taken to the hospitals much too
late and often little could be done for them anymore.54 The planters
usually excused this by referring to the immigrants’ general dislike
of hospital treatment. But the fact that the planters had to pay for
the treatment at the government hospital contributed at least as
significantly to the late hospitalisation of sick immigrants. Due to
the sanitary conditions on the estates and the late hospitalisations,
the mortality rate among the immigrant labourers was alarmingly
high. Therefore, the Ceylon Government decided in 1872 to organise
a new system of health care for the estate population. Ordinance
14 of 187255 divided the planting area into districts of manageable
size, each with a district hospital under a European medical officer. A
District Committee manned by the planters was responsible for the
working of the scheme in the district. The cost of this scheme was
to be covered by an acreage tax on the estates—the first direct land
tax in Ceylon.56 With the enactment of Ordinance 14 of 1872 the
government placed the responsibility for those new medical facilities
on the planting community. The planters naturally resented such
direct responsibility and especially the acreage tax. The reluctance
on the side of the planters to support the newmedical scheme was one
53 CO 56/11, Ceylon Acts 1879–1884.
54 M. Roberts, “Indian estate labour in Ceylon during the coffee period, (1830–
1880). Part 2”, Indian Economic and Social History Review, vol. 3, no. 2 (1966), 101.
55 CO 56/10, Ceylon Acts 1870–1878.
56 D. Wesumperuma, Indian Immigrant Plantation Workers, p. 243.
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factor for its failure. Another one was the enormous influx of Indian
immigrants during the years of famine in South India from 1876 to
1878. The additional increase in immigration proved to be beyond the
capabilities of the scheme.57 Accordingly, the new medical aid scheme
collapsed completely, and the Ceylon Government had to step into
the breach itself.With the enactment of theMedicalWantsOrdinance
in 1880, it took over the responsibility to provide adequate medical
facilities to the immigrants. Now the government was in charge of the
immigrant hospitals and the medical staff. Like in 1872, the planting
area was divided into districts, each with a district hospital and one or
more outdoor dispensaries. Every employer was obliged by law to send
a sick labourer to the hospital or—for a fee of 2.5 r.—to ask the local
medical officer to visit the estate and treat the patient on the spot.
The ordinance required every kangany to immediately report cases
of sickness to his employer. Furthermore, Superintending Medical
Officers were appointed to inspect the sanitary conditions on the
estates every half a year. Provisions were made for the registration of
births and deaths among the immigrant labourers, and the employer
had to supply food and lodging to mothers for a fortnight after the
birth of a child.58
To finance the new scheme, the Medical Wants Ordinance imposed
an export tax not exceeding 20 cents per hundredweight on coffee,
cacao and tea and a tax not exceeding 40 cents per hundredweight on
cinchona. The income from the tax went into the Medical Aid Fund.59
The planting community vigorously opposed the implementation of
the Medical Wants Ordinance. Especially, the planters despised the
introduction of an export duty on plantation crops, as they were of the
opinion that the government had to finance the Medical Aid scheme
out of the general revenue. And if it should really be found that a
new tax was necessary for the financial realisation of the scheme, the
planters pointed out, the import duty on rice should be increased.60 In
that case, the planters would have been able to pass the burden of the
increased duty on to their labourers.
The Planters’ Association petitioned hard against the confirmation
of Ordinance 17 of 188061—and found an ally in the Colonial Office.
57 M. Roberts, “Indian estate labour in Ceylon”, pp. 103–04.
58 D. Wesumperuma, Indian Immigrant Plantation Workers, p. 253.
59 CO 56/11, Ceylon Acts 1879–1884.
60 M. Roberts, “Indian estate labour in Ceylon”, p. 106.
61 CO 54/532, 5th March 1881/No. 12, Douglas to Kimberley. Enclosure.
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Whitehall opposed an export duty on plantation crops and proposed
a capitation tax on the number of employed immigrant labourers on
each estate. The provisions of theMedicalWantsOrdinance as regards
the medical facilities were not altered, but according to the wishes
of the Colonial Office, Ordinance 18 of 1881 was passed to amend
the Medical Wants Ordinance and replaced the export duty with
an annual tax on the number of immigrant employees.62 Later, the
Ceylon Government found that the capitation tax was impracticable
under the persisting circumstances and the amending Ordinance of
1881 was repealed. Ordinance 9 of 1882 abolished the capitation
tax and reinstated the export duty on plantation crops to finance the
scheme. Nevertheless, the government paid tribute to the constant
complaints of the planters and lowered the duty to a maximum of
10 cents per hundredweight on tea, coffee and cacao and a maximum
of 20 cents on cinchona.63 The government carried approximately
three-fourths of the total cost of the scheme, whereas the planters
contributed a mere quarter.
Thefirst report on theworking of the schemegave detailedfigures on
the cost of theMedical Aid system. The total expenditure amounted to
134,032.05 r. in 1883. Of that sum 30,021.33 r. were recovered from
the planters under the provisions of the Medical Wants Ordinance,
thus leaving a sum of 104,010.72 r. to be paid by the government.64
The unchanged mortality rate among the immigrants and the great
expenditure involved were the main drawbacks of the new scheme in
the eyes of the government. In the district hospitals, the death rate
still amounted to 19.84% of all hospitalised persons.65
Throughout the 1880s, the death rate among the coolies as well
as the general sanitary state of the estates did not improve on any
significant scale. Although the available medical facilities had been
multiplied, and hospitals and dispensaries had been erected, the late
hospitalisation of the sick labourers as the main problem remained.
Reference has already been made to the alleged reluctance of the
labourers to go to hospital. It was the prevailing opinion among
planters and administrators alike that the sick cooly himself delayed
his hospitalisation as long as possible in order to stay with his family
and friends. Contemporary remarks on the subject—even from critical
62 CO 56/11, Ceylon Acts 1879–1884.
63 CO 56/11, Ceylon Acts 1879–1884.
64 CO 54/554, 9th July 1884/No. 259, Gordon to Derby.
65 CO 54/554, 9th July 1884/No. 259, Gordon to Derby. Enclosure.
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men like Principal Civil Medical Officer Kynsey—mostly neglect the
determining influence of the employer and the kangany on the labourer.
Not only depended the kangany’s ‘head money’ on the number of
labourers turning up for work each day, he often also feared that
the sick labourer could run away when he was not under the kangany’s
direct control—e.g. in hospital.66 Therefore, many kanganies did not
report cases of sickness among the labourers and prevented or delayed
treatment or hospitalisation. The planter himself—if the kangany
informed him about cases of sickness—was similarly reluctant to treat
the cooly, because this inflicted additional costs on him.
In 1893, Governor Havelock finally appointed a commission to
investigate the deficiencies of the prevailing Medical Aid system
and to suggest possible remedies. The commission proposed the
creation of estate dispensaries to facilitate the medical treatment of
sick labourers. The planting community first resisted this proposal,
but later agreed to it and cooperated in the establishment of
estate dispensaries. The new prosperity of tea cultivation and the
rising demand for labour considerably influenced the planters in
that decision. By 1900, 103 estate dispensaries had been created.67
Although the commission’s assumption that ‘[i]t is the interest of the
Employers to keep their labourers in good health’68 proved to be correct
during times of labour shortage, the cooperation of the kanganies did
not improve. The estate dispensaries were frequently used, but in the
district hospitals the death rate among the immigrants remained at
the same high level.69 This stagnation can mostly be attributed to the
prevalence of the kangany system and the kanganies’ keenness on the
‘head money’.
Although the Medical Wants Ordinance was not successful in
reducing the high mortality rate among immigrant labourers and
only partially bettered the medical treatment offered to sick workers,
its enactment is a landmark in the history of nineteenth-century
labour policy in Ceylon. For the first time, the Ceylon Government
became directly involved inmatters of immigrant labour and took over
responsibility itself. Hitherto, the government had restricted itself to
the issuance of a vague and at times distorted legal basis regulating
labour contracts. Now, government officials were appointed to control
66 D. Wesumperuma, Indian Immigrant Plantation Workers, p. 257.
67 Ibid., p. 275.
68 CO 54/610, 5th November 1893/No. 378, Havelock to Ripon.
69 D. Wesumperuma, Indian Immigrant Plantation Workers, p. 273.
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TABLE 2
The Ceylon Coffee Industry, 1865–86 (Annual Figures and Annual Averages)
Year
Export volume
(in 000 cwt.)
Export unit
value (in s./cwt.)
Area planted
(in 000 acres)
Yield (in
cwt./acre)
1865–69 939 52 243 3.9
1870–74 881 66 276 3.2
1875–79 795 108 310 2.6
1880–84 433 89 259 1.7
1885 316 78 139 2.3
1886 179 89 110 1.6
Source: Snodgrass (1966): 20.
the implementation of the new law. So, almost half a century after the
introduction of the indenture system, ‘free’ labour migration finally
experienced some government control as well.
Tea, Tin Tickets and the Ceylon Labour Commission
In the closing years of the 1870s, the coffee industry of Ceylon saw the
beginning of its end. The total ruin of the island’s coffee plantations
within only a couple of years is such a prototypical example for the
hazards of monoculture that its story has been told over and over
again by planters, officials and historians alike. Here, it suffices to
say that a leaf fungus—later mostly called the Coffee Leaf Disease—
virtually wiped out Ceylon’s coffee plantations in the late 1870s and
early 1880s (see the decline in coffee acreage and exports in Table 2).
Although the planters tried to squeeze the last bit of sellable coffee
out of their holdings, the coffee planting enterprise was practically
dead by 1885. The prevalence of coffee monoculture in Ceylon had
favoured the wildfire-like spread of the disease in the first place. And
now the collapse of the island’s sole economic backbone drew thewhole
crown colony in a financial crisis of unforeseen extent. Only with the
capital derived from cinchona cultivation and the efforts put into the
cultivation of tea was this depression finally overcome. By the end of
the 1880s, the earlier experiments with tea cultivation had proved
profitable and finally re-introduced economic prosperity to the island
with the establishment of yet another monoculture (see Table 3 for
the growth of tea cultivation since 1880).
The tea boom of the late 1880s and 1890s dwarfed the ‘coffee-
mania’ of earlier decades and has only been possible due to the prior
IND IAN LABOUR IMMIGRATION 597
TABLE 3
Tea: Acreage and Exports, 1880–90
Year Acreage
Export volume
(lbs)
Export value
(Rs)
1880 14,266 162,576 150,641
1881 14,350 348,573 322,993
1882 12,482 697,268 591,806
1883 19,797 1,665,768 916,172
1884 57,626 2,392,973 1,435,784
1885 120,808 4,372,722 2,842,269
1886 164,758 7,849,888 5,102,427
1887 199,647 13,834,057 8,300,434
1888 231,601 23,820,472 12,624,850
1889 207,413 34,345,852 17,859,843
1890 235,794 45,799,519 22,899,759
Source: Ceylon Statistical Blue Books 1880–90.
existence of a plantation infrastructure in Ceylon. The labour demand
of the tea estates steadily increased: firstly, tea cultivation required
more labour per acre than coffee cultivation;70 and secondly, tea is
harvested year-round, whereas coffee has a single harvest season
(October to February in the case of Ceylon).71 Such rising labour
demands now often placed the planters at the mercy of their kanganies
who took full advantage of the blessings of the tundu system. The
capital-intensive tea industry had led to the gradual disappearance of
70 R. Wenzlhuemer, “The Sinhalese contribution to estate labour in Ceylon, 1881–
1891”, p. 450. L. A.Wickremeratne, “The establishment of the tea industry inCeylon.
The first phase, C 1870 to C 1900”, Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies (new
series), vol. 2, no. 2 (1972), 142.
71 The missing seasonal pattern of labour demand has often been identified as one
of themajor changes in labour immigration toCeylon brought about by tea cultivation.
Again, it is Patrick Peebles who now challenges this view: in his ‘Plantation Tamils
of Ceylon’ he tries to do away with the ‘myth of seasonal labour’. He suggests that the
coffee planters were interested in the maintenance of a large enough residential (i.e.
nonseasonal) labour force on their estate also outside the time of the coffee harvest.
Consequently, Peebles attributes the “discourse about ‘seasonal labour’” to a certain
‘construction of knowledge about Plantation Tamils’. In the end, figures and tables presented
by Peebles himself illustrate the partly seasonal character of labour migration during
coffee times. Although he attributes the time ofmigration to themonsoon rather than
to the coffee harvest, Peebles cannot explain the seasonal pattern of immigration and
emigration he himself depicts in Figure 4.1. Thus, labour immigration to the coffee
estate has been seasonal to a certain extent—with a growing resident labour force
present on the estates year-round. With the advent of tea cultivation this seasonal
pattern faded as tea required the same attendance throughout the year. P. Peebles,
The Plantation Tamils of Ceylon, pp. 81–83.
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the traditional proprietor-planter and to the emergence of estates run
by joint-stock tea companies. The close relationship many planters
had entertained with their head kanganies could rarely be upheld with
frequently changing superintendents in charge of the estates.72 Thus,
many kanganies felt less bound to their estates and made full use of
debt bondage and tundus. The increasing powers of the kangany urged
the planters (and later the Ceylon Government) to reform the system
of recruitment, transhipment and supervision of Indian labourers. In
1892, the planting community first tried to cut the coast advances
given to the kanganies by introducing a system of through-booking for
Indian immigrants. In cooperation with the South Indian Railway, the
British India SteamNavigation Company and the CeylonGovernment
Railway the planters tried to pre-organise their future labourers’
journey toCeylon and issued a part of the coast advances in railway and
steamer tickets.73 Unfortunately, this system had little official backing
and proved to be inefficient. Only when theCeylonGovernment joined
a similar scheme in 1901—the so-called ‘tin ticket’ system—a first
significant step was made to restrict the powers of the kangany. The
Ceylon Government started to issue tin tokens with a letter and
number stencilled on it referring to the estate hiring a labourer.
Estate superintendents bought these tickets from the government
and issued them to their kanganies who in turn took them to India and
distributed the tin tickets to the newly recruited labourers. The holder
of such a ticket immigrated to Ceylon with the support and under
the control of the Ceylon Government and was directly dispatched by
steamer and railway to the estate stencilled on his ticket. This seriously
limited the influence of the kanganies and—for the first time—brought
labour immigration at least partially under government supervision.74
Unfortunately, it did not significantly decrease the financial burden
of the labourers as the cost of the tin ticket was later added to their
initial debt.
Although the tin tickets proved to be a considerable success, the
planters and the government adopted further measures to supervise
labour recruitment and immigration. In 1904, the Ceylon Labour
Commission (CLC) was founded. The Ceylon Government gave the
commission official recognition and financed one-fourth of the total
72 D. Wesumperuma, Indian Immigrant Plantation Workers, pp. 65–66.
73 Ibid., p. 55.
74 Ibid., pp. 68–69.
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annual cost of the commission with a government grant.75 The
Ceylon Labour Commission had several agencies in South India
and supervised the kanganies’ work there. The CLC organised and
financed necessary cash advances, monitored the recruitment process
and issued tin tickets in South India.76 This meant that finally the
recruiting kanganies had come under closer control of the planters and
the government. Little space was left to overcharge the labourers on
their travel costs or to withhold money due to them. The efforts of the
Planters’ Association and direct government intervention reduced the
abuses of coast advances and tundus on the part of the kanganies.
Nevertheless, the situation of the labourers improved only gradually.
The travel cost was still added to their initial debt and rice and balance
wages were still incredibly low. This is altogether not surprising as it
had never been the goal of government (nor the planters’) intervention
to better the situation of the immigrant labourers. Instead, ‘the aim of
the CLC was to get labor cheaper’.77
Conclusion
Duringmost of the nineteenth century, the labour policy of the Ceylon
Government limited itself to the regulation of the legal status of the
immigrant labourers and of the terms of contract between employers
and employees. The legislative complex known as the Master and
Servant Laws on the one hand favoured the planting community
by making a wide array of contract breaches on the part of the
labourers subject to criminal prosecution. On the other hand, it
officially recognised and regulated the practice of self-renewing one-
month verbal contracts between the planter and the labourer which
could (theoretically) be terminated at onemonth’s notice. Considering
the large and steadily increasing labour demand of the plantations
this practice would normally have been beneficial for the labourers
by improving their bargaining position. But such effects of the law
were counteracted by the emergence of the kangany system of labour
recruitment and supervision that, instead of a proper government
labour policy, regulated the influx of immigrant labourers as well
as their working and living conditions. Practically from the time of
75 Ibid., pp. 69–70.
76 P. Peebles, The Plantation Tamils of Ceylon, p. 65.
77 Ibid.
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recruitment in India, the labourers were indebted to the planters (or
later the kanganies) and were thus bound to the plantations. Although
almost all labourers only entered into one-month verbal contracts,
high initial debt, marginal balance wages and their dependence on the
kangany usually prevented the termination of an engagement at short
notice. In reality, many immigrant labourers were as tightly attached
to their plantations as their West Indian or Mauritian counterparts
under the indenture system. In the absence of any direct government
intervention in labour issues, the kangany and tundu systems acted as
functional equivalents securing a steady influx of immigrant labour,
organising the recruitment and transhipment of the labourers and
regulating much of the labourers’ work and life on the plantations.
Only in the year 1880 the Ceylon Government became directly
involved in immigrant labour policy through the enactment of the
Medical Wants Ordinance. For the first time, the government took
over direct responsibility for the medical treatment of the immigrant
labourers thus paying tribute to the enormously high death rate among
plantationworkers. Twenty years later, theCeylonGovernment finally
started to monitor and support labour recruitment and transhipment
directly. It cooperated with the Ceylon Planters’ Association and
inaugurated the tin ticket system in 1901 and the Ceylon Labour
Commission in 1904. These two occasions mark the beginning of real
government involvement in immigration matters—although it took
the Indian and the Ceylon Government 19 more years to bring about
more far-reaching changes in the system that would be positively felt
by the immigrant labourers themselves.78
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